Abstract-We explore software diversity as a defense against side-channel attacks by dynamically and systematically randomizing the control flow of programs. Existing software diversity techniques transform each program trace identically. Our diversity based technique instead transforms programs to make each program trace unique. This approach offers probabilistic protection against both online and off-line side-channel attacks.
In particular, we create a large number of unique program execution paths by automatically generating diversified replicas for parts of an input program. Replicas derived from the same original program fragment have different implementations, but perform semantically equivalent computations. At runtime we then randomly and frequently switch between these replicas.
We evaluate how well our approach thwarts cache-based sidechannel attacks, in which an attacker strives to recover cryptographic keys by analyzing side-effects of program execution. Our method requires no manual effort or hardware changes, has a reasonable performance impact, and reduces side-channel information leakage significantly.
I. MOTIVATION
Artificial software diversity, like its biological counterpart, is a highly flexible and efficient defense mechanism. Code injection, code reuse, and reverse engineering attacks are all significantly harder against diversified software ([1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] ). We propose to extend software diversity to protect against side-channel attacks, in particular cache side channels.
Essentially, artificial software diversity denies attackers precise knowledge of their target by randomizing implementation features of a program. Because code reuse and other related attacks rely on static properties of a program, previous work on software diversity predominantly focuses on randomizing the program representation, e.g., the in-memory addresses of code and data. Side-channel attacks, on the other hand, rely on dynamic properties of programs, e.g., execution time, memory latencies, or power consumption. Consequently, diversification against side channels must randomize a program's execution rather than its representation.
Most existing diversification approaches randomize programs before execution, e.g., during compilation, installation, or loading. Ahead-of-time randomization is desirable because rediversification during runtime impacts performance (similar to just-in-time compilation). Some approaches interleave program randomization and program execution ( [9] , [6] , [10] , [11] ). However, the granularity of randomization in these approaches is quite coarse, potentially allowing an attacker to observe the program uninterrupted for long enough to carry out a successful side-channel attack. We avoid this problem by extending techniques used to prevent reverse engineering such as code replication and control-flow randomization ( [12] , [7] ). Unlike these approaches, however, we replicate code at a finer grained level and produce a nearly unlimited number of runtime paths by randomly switching between these replicas. Rather than making control flow difficult to reverse engineer, our technique randomly switches execution between different copies of program fragments, which we refer to as replicas, to randomize executed code and thus side-channel observations. We call this new capability dynamic control-flow diversity.
To vary the side-channel characteristics of replicas, we employ diversifying transformations. Diversification preserves the original program semantics while ensuring that each replica differs at the level of machine instructions. To protect against cache side-channel attacks we use diversifications that vary observable execution characteristics. Like other cache sidechannel mitigations, such as reloading the cache on context switches and rewriting encryption routines to avoid optimized lookup tables, introducing diversity has some performance impact which we rigorously quantify in this paper.
In combination, dynamic control-flow diversity and diversifying transformations create binaries with randomized program traces, without requiring hardware or developer assistance. In this paper we explore the use of dynamic control-flow diversity against cache-based side-channel attacks on cryptographic algorithms. Our main contributions are the following:
• We apply the new capability of dynamic control-flow diversity to the problem of side channels. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first use of automated software diversity to mitigate cache side channels.
• We show how to generate machine code for efficient randomized control-flow transfers and combine this with a diversifying transformation to counter cachebased side-channel attacks.
• We present a careful and detailed evaluation of applying diversity to protect cache side channels and report the following: Cache shown is 3MB in size, with 4096 (2 12 ) sets, 12-way associativity and 64-byte cache lines. Memory addresses are broken into a 46-bit (or less) tag, a 12-bit set number and a 6-bit line offset.
be placed into exactly one of these n sets. Each set stores at most m lines simultaneously, in which case the cache is called "m-way set associative". In practice, caches are 4-, 8-, 12-and 16-way associative. Figure 2 shows the structure of a 3MB 12-way set associative cache found in our test system. For efficiency, the processor shares these caches between running processes but prevents processes from accessing data belonging to other processes via the virtual memory abstraction. However, since data from multiple processes is concurrently stored in the cache, adversaries can indirectly deduce information about which cache locations a target process accesses by observing side-effects of cache accesses. Since the data cache access patterns of many programs are inputdependent and predictable, attackers can use knowledge of some inputs and the target's data access patterns to derive the secret input.
To exploit cache access patterns, all cache timing attacks rely on the same fundamental principle of cache behavior: accessing data stored in the cache is measurably faster than accessing the data from main memory. As a result, attacks can exploit this principle as a side channel and observe different cache behavior for certain segments of a program trace. In the EVICT+TIME attack, we observe the effect of evicting an entire cache set and forcing the encryption program to fetch values from main memory, while in the PRIME+PROBE attack we fill a cache set and check which cache lines the encryption evicts by observing the time to reload our data.
For convenience we summarize both AES attacks here but refer interested readers to Tromer et al. [13] for further details. Optimized AES implementations use four in-memory tables (T 0 through T 3 , each containing 256 four-byte values) during encryption, and the access pattern of these tables varies according to the key and plaintext inputs. Specifically, during the first of ten encryption rounds for plaintext p and key k, the encryption process will access table T l at index p i ⊕ k i Input : Cache set c to probe, plaintext p, key k. Output : Time needed to encrypt the plaintext after probing c. Encrypt(k, p); Evict cache set c; t 0 ←Time(); Encrypt(k, p); t 1 ←Time(); return t 1 − t 0 ; Algorithm 1: EVICT+TIME attack.
Input : Array C of cache sets to probe, plaintext p, key k. Output : Array T of times needed to probe each set in
Read w values into cache set c from memory;
Read w values from cache set c;
Algorithm 2: PRIME+PROBE attack.
for all i = 0, . . . , 15 where l = i mod 4. Since we assume the attacker knows the plaintext p, the attacker is able to derive information about the key from information about which table elements are loaded from memory.
Algorithm 1 shows the EVICT+TIME attack. We derive the table access patterns by observing the total execution time of the encryption routine. By first running the encryption on a chosen, random plaintext, we prime the cache with the table entries required during the encryption of this plaintext. We then completely evict a cache set by loading a set of memory locations that all map into the chosen cache set. By timing another encryption of the same plaintext, we can then, by averaging over many runs, determine whether the encryption used a table value from that cache set, since the encryption routine will take longer when accessing an evicted table entry due to the cache miss.
The PRIME+PROBE attack (shown in Algorithm 2) is very similar to the EVICT+TIME attack, but with the timing and eviction roles flipped. In this attack we first create a known starting cache state by loading a set of memory locations into each relevant cache set. We then trigger encryption of a chosen plaintext, which will modify this cache state by caching accessed table entries. Finally, we determine which cache sets were modified by timing a load of each cache set again. The cache sets corresponding to table entries that the encryption accessed will take longer to load than those not used, since the encryption table entry will have displaced one of the original entries loaded by the attacker and thus incur at least one cache miss.
By analyzing a large set of these cache observations for randomly chosen plaintexts, we can determine the key bits that 5-25% rate reduced the average correctly recovered key bits to 81. Adding dynamic control-flow diversity on top of this further reduced the recovered key bits to 64 and 54 for functionlevel and basic block-level diversity respectively. At the 10-50% insertion rate we observed similar trends, with CF/BB and dynamic loads reducing the EVICT+TIME key recovery to 20 bits. Dynamic cache loads naturally have a higher performance variation, since they require an extra indirect load to implement runtime dynamic randomness. This results in a more pronounced impact on the EVICT+TIME attack.
We observed similar trends for the PRIME+PROBE attack. While dynamic loads have some effect on the attack by themselves, they are most effective when combined with function or basic-block dynamic control-flow diversity. In the best case (CF/BB + Dyn) we observed an average correct key recovery of only 14 bits. This result is near the theoretical limit of 8 bits where an attacker gains no information from the side channel. Recovering 8 bits of the key is equivalent to an adversary randomly guessing the key by nibbles without side-channel information, since such an adversary has a 1 in 16 chance to guess each nibble correctly and each key nibble is independent for uniform random keys. This expected number of correctly guessed key bits with no knowledge is a lower bound on the accuracy of any side-channel attack, and we show this bound as a dashed line in Figure 7 .
Increasing samples: To investigate whether the attacks could feasibly overcome our defense by gathering more side-channel observations, we increased the iteration count for both attacks. We found that while the attack accuracy increased marginally with 4x and 8x the number of original attack measurements, a realistic attack is still infeasible. With the CF/BB + Static (10-50%) setting, 4x iterations resulted in average correctness of 70 bits for the EVICT+TIME attack and 34 bits for the PRIME+PROBE attack. 8x iterations resulted in 42 correct key bits on average for the PRIME+PROBE attack. These results indicate that dynamic control-flow diversity is still effective in the presence of better resourced attackers, although it may require a different diversifying transformation to be more effective against the EVICT+TIME attack.
Collecting eight times more samples than in our baseline attack required about five minutes of attack time, resulted in a 1.5GiB data file, and analysis took about an hour on a high end, quad-core c3.xlarge Amazon EC2 instance. In a more realistic situation collecting many more samples than this is likely prohibitive. It is important to remember that our attack is simply encrypting a single block, with no inter-process communication or application overhead. Our tests represent a best-case scenario for an attacker. A realistic attack would target a service which is doing more work than our test attacks, and thus data collection would be far slower and noisier in practice.
B. Performance Evaluation
Most existing defenses against cache side-channel attacks, e.g., reloading sensitive tables into cache after every context switch or rewriting encryption algorithms to not use cached tables at all, introduce moderate overheads. Our transformations also marginally increase the cost of AES encryption. However we believe this overhead to be quite reasonable for an automated and general side-channel defense. To properly quantify this impact, we studied an AES micro-benchmark, a full-fledged service -Apache serving files over HTTPS using AES -and the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite.
From this performance analysis, in conjunction with attack success, we found that the optimal trade-off between security and performance is the CF/F + Static Loads setting. The CF/BB + Static Loads setting was slightly more effective, with only a small marginal decrease in performance, and is thus also an ideal candidate setting. Using dynamic loads, while slightly more effective, has a significantly larger performance impact for comparably little marginal security benefit. AES Micro-benchmark: We first measured the increase in time introduced by each transformation with an AES microbenchmark. We generated ten random different versions of libgcrypt for each set of parameters, ran each version of the AES encryption function five million times on random plaintexts for each of ten different random keys and measured the number of cycles for each encryption. The first column of each group in Figure 8 shows the slowdown for the libgcrypt micro-benchmark.
We found that using function or basic-block level dynamic control-flow diversity along with static cache noise results in a performance slowdown of 1.76x-2.02x compared to the baseline AES encryption when using 10-50% cache noise insertion. Dynamic cache noise at a 5-25% rate results in similar performance, but 10-50% insertion of dynamic loads has significantly more impact on performance (2.39-2.87x slowdown).
In addition to measuring encryption time, we investigated the impact of our transformations on the size of the encryption library. While desktop disk space is currently plentiful, this is not the case for embedded or mobile systems. Many programs are also distributed over the Internet through communication links that have either bandwidth or data limits. Table I shows the impact of our transformations on the size of the libgcrypt shared object.
Application Benchmark: In the previous section we measured the performance impact on AES encryption alone, encrypting a single block. However, to get a more realistic picture of the performance impact of our techniques, we also evaluated the performance overhead of dynamic control-flow diversity and our transformations on Apache 2.4.10 serving AES encrypted data. We used the standard apachebench (ab) tool to evaluate performance, connecting over https to an Apache instance using a diversified version of the OpenSSL 1.0.1 library 2 .
As seen in the second column of each group in Figure 8 , the overall slowdown of our techniques varies from 1.25x for static cache noise to 2.1x for dynamic. The static noise CF/F and CF/BB settings in fact have identical overheads in this test, and we therefore recommend the CF/BB setting for practical applications which consist of more than just block cipher encryption. The overall performance impact is naturally lower than the simple micro-benchmark, since Apache does other processing in addition to encryption. However, this workload is 2 While we have not tested the effectiveness of the side-channel attack on this library, we believe it would take minimal effort to port the attack to OpenSSL or other table-based AES implementations. more representative of a real-world application of cryptography and AES in particular.
SPEC CPU2006:
To illustrate the effects of our techniques on CPU intensive workloads, we tested with the C and C++ portions of the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite. We selected one parameter setting: function-level dynamic control-flow diversity with static noise. However, since SPEC does not have any particular targets for cache side-channel attacks, we applied dynamic control-flow diversity universally over all functions with a 25% probability. We also applied static cache noise over all functions with a probability to insert noise for each instruction chosen randomly for each basic block from the range 10-50%. These parameters represent a worst-case for the CF/F + Dyn setting. To account for random choices, we built and ran SPEC with four different random seeds As we show in Figure 9 , our transformations introduce a 1.82x geometric mean overhead across all benchmarks. The xalancbmk and dealII benchmarks stand out in this test. These particular benchmarks are large, complex C++ programs with many function calls. Since we applied function dynamic controlflow diversity across the entire program in this case, we naturally incur a higher overhead when the program calls many small functions. In practice users of dynamic controlflow diversity should target transformations in only the sections of code which might be vulnerable to a side-channel attack, instead.
V. DISCUSSION

A. Parameter Settings
In our experiments we determined that a 5-25% insertion percentage range for cache noise instructions is too narrow. Dynamic control-flow diversity works best when replicas have very different runtime behavior, since it relies on switching between replicas with varying side-channel effects. In addition, libgcrypt is mostly straight line code and thus has a relatively low number of functions and basic blocks used for AES encryption. We expect that more complex cryptographic algorithms such as RSA will have more control flow, and thus more opportunity to insert dynamic control-flow diversity and switch between variants.
Cache noise, especially the dynamic variant, has an impact on execution time and thus the EVICT+TIME attack. However, this transformation is designed specifically to disrupt the PRIME+PROBE attack by polluting the cache and masking real AES table cache accesses. A transformation targeted at varying the running time of each replica would be more suited to disrupting this attack. We could adapt proposed hardware junk code insertion techniques [21] , [22] to work with dynamic control-flow diversity by inserting differing code with varying runtimes into each replica.
In the best case, CF/BB + Dyn (10-50%), our EVICT+TIME attack can derive only 4.96 key nibbles, or about 20 key bits. Even with a more performance conscious alternative, CF/BB + Static (10-50%), we still prevent the attacker from finding 80 of 128 key bits. In the PRIME+PROBE attack our experiments show an average of 3.32 correctly recovered key nibbles, or 13.28 key bits, for the CF/BB + Static (10-50%) setting. The remaining approximately unknown key bits are too much to brute-force search, since this would require checking 2 n key guesses, where n is the number of unknown key bits. With this low correctness an attacker is unlikely to even be able to determine which key nibbles are correct, and thus would gain no useful information from the attack. Thus, we conclude that our techniques effectively mitigate the PRIME+PROBE attack, given a realistic attack scenario.
We chose example parameters of ten replicas for each program unit along with 5-25 and 10-50 percent probability of inserting cache noise operations at each instruction as a starting point after initial experimentation. These parameters are representative of a narrow and wider range of insertion. However, these parameters may not represent an ideal trade-off between security and performance. In fact, these parameter settings are not mutually exclusive, e.g., some functions may be diversified with static noise while others get dynamic noise. Some combination of function and basic block replicas may also be useful for some applications. For future work, we propose to develop heuristics for automatic parameter selection through application and attack profiling.
B. Disabled Cache
Disabling caching of critical memory is an often suggested naive approach to preventing cache side-channel attacks [13] . This approach is attractive since existing commodity processors support selectively disabling page caching, but unfortunately it is prohibitively slow. To verify that this mitigation is impractical, we carefully measured the performance of the AES routine in libgcrypt with caching disabled for the AES lookup tables. This required writing a custom Linux kernel module to map and mark a page of memory as uncacheable using the Page Attribute Table ( PAT) available on x86 CPUs. The user mode application, in this case libgcrypt, can then map this page into its address space and store the lookup table into it. This interface, while technically possible, is complex and not available in the standard Linux kernel.
We modified libgcrypt to utilize this approach and tested the same AES micro-benchmark described above. We found that disabling caching on only the single AES lookup page caused the encryption routine to be 75 times slower than normal. Therefore disabling caching, even for a single page, is impractical on modern hardware. We discuss other hardware based cache protections in Section VI, however, these approaches are not available in commodity processors.
C. Implementation Limitations
For our initial investigation of applying control-flow diversity to side channels, we manually inspected the libgcrypt AES implementation to select nine functions relevant to the encryption algorithm. This simple step required no modification to the original sources, and could be easily automated by supplying only an encryption entry point. We forced our system to replicate these functions and their basic blocks to demonstrate the effectiveness of our techniques in a controlled environment, without the additional complication of having the system automatically select program units for diversification at random. However, this small manual effort was done to arrive at a controlled experiment and is not required to use control-flow diversity. By randomly selecting program units for replication with some configurable probability, our system can probabilistically protect an entire application from side-channel attacks with no manual effort.
Instead of random or manual program unit selection, we believe that side-channel analysis tools such as CacheAudit [23] can guide the selection of the critical program fragments and parameters for diversification. This should eliminate all manual effort while preserving a high level of security.
D. Related Attacks
Diversifying transformations, such as inserting cache noise instructions, can also be used to perform fine grained code layout randomization. This provides probabilistic protection against return-oriented programming and its variants which makes it realistic to expect that our defense technique can simultaneously defend against two or more fundamentally different classes of attacks. We will pursue this research direction in follow up work as well.
VI. RELATED WORK
This paper unites two previously unrelated strands of research: side channels and artificial software diversity. We discuss the related work in each of these areas separately.
A. Side Channels
After Kocher described an initial timing side-channel attack on public-key cryptosystems [24] , researchers have proposed a multitude of side-channel attacks against cryptographic algorithms. While researchers have proposed many different side-channel vectors ranging from power analysis [25] to acoustic analysis [26] , we focus on applying our techniques against timing and cache-based attacks not requiring physical access. Cache-based attacks were first theoretically described by Page [27] [28] demonstrated cache-based attacks against DES in practice. Bernstein [29] then presented a simple timing attack on AES, along with potential causes of this timing variability, including variable cache behavior and latency. Shortly after, Osvik, Shamir, and Tromer [30] , [13] presented their attacks on AES, including the two example attacks used in this paper. In addition to the two synchronous attacks we evaluated our techniques against, Osvik et al. also described an asynchronous attack relying only on passively observing encryptions of plaintexts from a known but non-uniform distribution.
Recently, Hund et al. [31] used a cache-based timing sidechannel attack to de-randomize kernel space ASLR in order to accurately perform code-reuse attacks in the kernel address space. Since we build our system on techniques proven to be effective against code-reuse attacks, our dynamic control-flow diversity with NOP insertion is a perfect fit to defend in depth against this attack.
As side-channel attacks have matured, researchers have proposed numerous defenses using both hardware and software. We will now briefly describe a few of the relevant defenses.
Hardware Defenses: Several different methods of preventing side channels at the hardware level have been proposed, with varying degrees of practicality. In the context of differential power analysis attacks, Irwin et al [21] proposed a new stage in the processor execution pipeline which randomly mutates the instruction stream with the assistance of a compiler-generated register liveness map. Among other peephole transformations, this mutation unit adds instructions that do not affect the correct functioning of the program, which are a super-set of our compiler-based NOP insertion transformation. Since our transformations in software are similar to the techniques Irwin et al. applied to differential power analysis, we expect that our technique will apply directly to power analysis attacks as well. Finally, Irwin et al. proposed a new probabilistic branch instruction, maybe, that would allow us to efficiently randomize control flow without the use of a random buffer. Ambrose et al. [22] also proposed inserting random instructions but with the added requirement that inserted instructions modify processor state, e.g., registers, so the new instructions are indistinguishable from legitimate program code.
To specifically target cache-based attacks, Page [32] proposed partitioning the cache into disjoint configurable sets so that a sensitive program cannot share cache resources with an attacker. However this would require a radical change to current cache designs. Bernstein [29] suggested the addition of a new CPU instruction to load an entire table into L1 cache and perform a lookup. This approach provides consistent cache access behavior regardless of input, and as such would eliminate cache side channels through table lookups. Wang and Lee [33] also proposed two new hardware cache designs to mitigate cache side channels: PLcache and RPcache. PLcache has the new capability of locking a sensitive cache partition into cache, while RPcache randomizes the mapping from memory locations to cache sets. While these techniques are powerful mitigations against cache side-channel attacks, they all require additional hardware features which major processor vendors are unlikely to implement. In contrast, our techniques require no special hardware support and can be used immediately.
Intel has recently implemented a new hardware instruction to perform encryption and decryption for AES [34] . Since this instruction is data independent, using it instead of a software routine should protect against side-channel attacks on AES. However, this hardware only implements AES, and thus we still need defensive measures to protect other cryptographic algorithms.
Software Defenses: The ideal defense against side-channel attacks is to modify the sensitive program so that it has no input-dependent side-effects, however this is an extremely labor-intensive solution and is often infeasible. Developers generally take this approach to removing timing side channels by creating algorithms that run in constant-time regardless of inputs. Bernstein [29] strongly recommends this approach, while cautioning that software which the programmer expected to run in constant time may not do so due to hardware complexity.
Page [35] suggested manually adding noise to encryption to make cache side-channel attacks more difficult in a manner conceptually similar to our automatic randomizing transformations. For instance, Page manually inserted garbage instructions and random loads into the encryption routine to combat timing and trace based attacks respectively. Page's work is a form of obfuscation rather than diversification since all users run the same binaries with the same runtime control-flow. Our combination of control flow randomization and garbage code insertion simultaneously defends against code reuse attacks and side channels whereas garbage code in itself does not protect against side channels and Page's transformations do not protect against code reuse.
Brickell et al. [36] proposed the use of compressed and randomized tables for AES that would alleviate cache-based attacks. However, this implementation process requires manually rewriting the AES implementation and is specific to the operation of AES.
Cleemput et al. [37] proposed defenses that do not require manual program modification. In particular, they described the use of compiler transformations to reduce timing variability. Our approach, while also compiler-based, seeks to mask variability rather than remove it entirely, since opportunities to automatically eliminate variable-time routines are limited.
In their recent paper addressing side-channel attacks in the context of virtualized cloud computing, Zhang and Reiter [38] proposed periodically scrubbing shared caches used by sensitive processes. This scheme potentially breaks cache snooping by a time-shared process on the same core, but will not necessarily combat cache attacks in a Simultaneous Multithreading (SMT) context or continuous power analysis attacks. Since our random decision points are more fine grained than the scrubbing interval, our techniques have greater potential against these finegrained attacks, although this would require more investigation. In addition, control-flow diversity does not depend on any resources outside the program and is thus applicable in situations without hypervisors, such as embedded software.
Finally, Tromer et al. [13] mention adding noise to memory accesses with spurious accesses to decrease the signal available to the attacker. Effectively, our technique accomplishes this goal in a general way that could be extended to other side channels, and we provide a concrete evaluation showing its effectiveness in practice. Since adding replicas exponentially increases the number of possible execution traces, we can ratchet our defense up sufficiently so that an attacker cannot feasibly collect and analyze enough samples.
B. Artificial Software Diversity
The literature on artificial software diversity is extensive; we limit ourselves to the work most closely related to ours. Larsen et al. provides a comprehensive systematization of approaches to artificial software diversity [39] . Cohen initially pioneered software diversity as a protection against reverse engineering [1] and was first to suggest garbage code insertion and transformations that obscure the actual control flow. Collberg et al. [40] extended these ideas into a broader set of obfuscating transformations against reverse engineering attacks and introduced the notion of opaque predicates [41] . While opaque predicates usually refer to predicates that have a known outcome at obfuscation time but are expensive to decide afterward via static analysis, Collberg et al. also mention "variable" opaque predicates that flip-flop between true and false at runtime. These ideas were evaluated in depth by Anckaert et al. [12] as a defense against reverse engineering, by Collberg et al. [8] in context of client-side tampering of networked systems, and by Coppens et al. [7] to prevent reverse engineering of patches. Our work differs in its use of control flow randomization: we use it to switch among implementation variants (replicas) with fine-granularity-not as a randomizing transformation in itself. Furthermore, we aim to thwart sidechannel attacks rather than reverse engineering.
Several diversified defenses against code reuse attacks have dynamic aspects. Giuffrida et al. [6] presented a compilerbased approach that periodically rerandomizes services in a microkernel OS while it is running. Live rerandomization works by periodically transferring the application state from one process to another such that the old and new processes run diversified variants of the same input program. While this provides excellent protection against code reuse attacks, the rerandomization overhead prevents the fine granularity our approach efficiently supports.
Hiser et al. [4] performed fine-grained code layout randomization using a process virtual machine. The approach uses a code cache that leads to predictable program traces and might constitute a side channel in itself. Homescu et al. [11] diversifies just-in-time compiled code and similarly caches translated code to improve performance. Shioji et al. [10] introduced "code shredding" that embeds random checksums in pointers to thwart control-flow hijacking. To improve performance and add randomness, checksums are not masked out before the pointer values are used in control flow transfers. Rather, the entire code section is replicated in process memory to make the targets of checksummed pointers valid. Our use of code replication is more flexible because our granularity can vary at the function or basic block level and has a lower memory overhead as a result. Our performance overhead is also much lower since our compiler-based approach avoids the overheads associated with binary rewriting; Shioji report overheads ranging from 3x to 26x on Bzip2 1.0.5.
Novark and Berger secure the heap against memory management errors via a randomizing memory allocator [9] . Allocations are placed randomly in memory and stay in place until their deallocation. Freed pages are overwritten with random data. While this can interfere with side-channel attacks, attackers can sample the victim process arbitrarily many times between memory allocator activations.
Summing up, our work is the first to use software diversity to mitigate cache side-channel attacks. Previous diversification approaches comprise one or more randomizing code transformations. Our approach consists of a runtime randomization mechanism to dynamically vary execution characteristics in addition to a set of randomizing code transformations.
VII. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
We provide the first evaluation of software diversity as a side-channel mitigation. To that end, we developed dynamic control-flow diversity which performs fine-grained program trace randomization. Our technique does not require source code modification or specialized hardware so it can be automatically applied to existing software. We have implemented a prototype diversifier atop LLVM and rigorously evaluated the performance of our techniques using modern, realistic cache side-channel attacks in a setting that favors attackers. Our experimental evaluation shows that our technique mitigates cryptographic side channels with high efficacy and moderate overhead of 1.5-2x in practice, making it viable for deployment.
Beyond the cryptographic side-channel problem addressed in this paper, we expect that control-flow diversity is simultaneously effective against other implementation-dependent attacks, including code reuse and reverse engineering. We plan to explore this in future work.
